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ABSTRACT: The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical 
problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal 
disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to 
their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody 
serious argumentative (and even moral) vices. 
 




Many of us are in these fields because of our strong commitment to the notion that 
reasoning is an important way to resolve disputes, conflicts, disagreements, fights, 
standoffs, and so on. Sure. But the wrong question to ask about deep disagreements 
is: How can reasons-giving resolve them? Someone with Austinian patience could do 
us a great favor by categorizing kinds of disagreements. But the key picture that I 
have joined others (like Fogelin (1985) and Turner and Wright (2005) and Godden 
and Brenner (2010)) in offering is of a kind of disagreement that reasons can’t fix. 
And the key insight of that picture resides in the idea that reasons rely for their 
efficacy on conditions that do not always obtain.   
Of course, if someone will not “listen to reason,” then the conditions of 
reasoning are not met. We could list a hundred similar obstacles. But when I focus 
on deep disagreement, I am thinking about something else altogether, something 
that has to do with where reasons come from, how they work, what they’re for, and 
where they can’t work. In order to be able to get to what I want to say about virtue 
and argumentation, let me briefly sketch the points that I have tried elsewhere to 
establish. 
First, about the word “disagreement” in the phrase “deep disagreement.” It’s 
not quite right. Typically, the word “disagreement” conjures up conflicting or 
contradictory convictions. But when it comes to deep disagreement, it is misleading 
to put the accent on the differing convictions. The accent needs to be not on 
difference, but rather on not being enough the same.   
A deep disagreement is one special kind of not-agreeing, a gap between us, 
about how to go on together. What came before it was smooth, unremarkable, 
concerted, action. We were, we almost always are, going on together. It would take 
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volumes, in German, to fully explain that. The best I can do here is to gesture:   We 
are, all of us, at all times, engaged in an enormous number of activities, practices, 
doings. Some of them are readily distinguished from others, while some have no 
special names, or noticeable or articulated characters. Sometimes one of the things 
we’re doing comes to our attention temporarily, then fades again into the general 
unnoticed host of doings. Often, almost always, the many doings in which we are 
engaged flow smoothly together with those engaged in by others. We weave in and 
out of each other’s lives, at every moment, and almost always unremarkably. That is, 
sometimes we are intentionally cooperating, but almost always, we are co-operating 
without any special decision to do so, or need to talk about it. Here’s the picture:  a 
many-faceted, thoroughly concerted, constantly shifting flow of engagement.    
We also must note here that any particular doing can probably be described 
as part of any number of activities. Whatever I’m doing when brushing my teeth 
often also counts as getting ready for bed, tending to hygiene, preserving the health 
of my gums, earning the praise of my dentist, avoiding my OSSA deadlines, etc. So 
while we are engaged in a constantly shifting, cooperative flow of doing, any part of 
it, at any moment, could be described in any number of ways. This will be important 
later. 
The flow is broken, or at least changed, very often—though context 
determines almost everything about our experience of just when and how. Did I 
stop making pancakes and start squeezing juice out of oranges? Or was I doing the 
same thing the whole time:  making breakfast? What we do can be variously 
characterized, so we should expect that even questions about when we started or 
stopped doing something will depend to a great degree on who’s asking, and why. 
Sometimes we find ourselves brought up short. We were doing whatever we were 
doing, and then we find that we can’t go on, we are interrupted or somehow 
discontinued. Maybe the sound of some commotion makes me put down my book. 
Or I forget how to make a daiquiri. Or I notice that my shoelaces are untied. Then I 
have to get on with things somehow. Maybe I have to stop reading my book in order 
to clean up everything the dog knocked over. Or maybe I look up the daiquiri recipe 
and make a few. In general, we “get on with things,” but there’s no general plan for 
this. Sometimes I seek the help of Google, sometimes I ignore the interruption, 
sometimes I just decide to do something else. Very often, I simply fall back on my 
vast expertise in almost all of the things I do on a regular basis. I just tie my 
shoelaces. I did not always understand the ways of shoelaces, but now I am an 
expert. If you don’t like the word “expertise” you can use “competence,” or, 
“understanding.” Taken together, the everyday activities in which I’m regularly and 
ceaselessly engaged, the things I understand, the bits of my competence, must 
number in the millions.   
I say “millions,” but who knows how to distinguish such facets from each 
other? Again, we could break down and explain any given activity in any number of 
ways, depending on our purposes, interests, and audience. To a beekeeper I could 
say, for example:  “I checked my hives—they were fine.” To a non-beekeeper I might 
have to explain the same activity and judgment in many more words. To someone 
who knew nothing about bees, or insects, or flowers, or seasons, or biology, or any 
of that, there might be nothing I could say, no matter how minute my description, to 
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get the message across. Indeed, at some absurd remove, it would not even be clear 
what message I could possibly be motivated or able to convey at all. Now that would 
be a formidable gap between two bodies of understanding. Happily, it is almost 
impossible to imagine how I could encounter someone whose understanding of life 
and the world had so little in common with mine. Of course just speaking the same 
language (or mutually translatable languages) means that we share a very great 
deal.  
Instead of “disagreement,” then, maybe we should always say “gap.” If people 
didn’t share enough understanding, the gap would be too deep to close using any of 
our usual inter-personal gap-closing remedies. Many of those remedies involve 
ways of using language. And one of those that we prize the most is the giving of 
reasons. (I will leave alone, for the moment, very complicated questions about the 
relationship between the giving of reasons and other ways of using language to 
remedy gaps in understanding.) Now, just as I don’t always need to remedy an 
interruption in my own more or less solitary activity—I can leave the car up on 
cinder blocks, for example—we don’t always need to remedy gaps in our shared 
understanding. We can leave them alone. We can change the subject. There are 
always other things to do. But sometimes we feel compelled to try to get back on the 
same page. This is particularly the case when we are very intentionally doing 
something together, and when it is of some importance to us that we go on together. 
And then, sometimes, giving reasons is just the ticket. 
Imagine that we’re walking in the woods and reach a fork in the path. What 
to do? You say, “let’s go left—it leads to a great overlook.” I say, “We need to go 
right—my little map here says that that trail is closed.” Simple. Now, if I had said 
(and meant), “Well, I guess we should teleport out,” I expect that you would not 
know what to say. Probably you would take me to be joking. Or maybe you’d try to 
explain to me the meaning of the word “teleport.” But if I accepted your definition, 
yet maintained sincerely that our best, our only, option is teleportation, it would 
signal such a vast difference in how we understand the world, and so very much of 
the world, that you’d find it difficult to know where to start. What could you say to 
get us back on the same page? Luckily, things like that almost never happen. Almost 
every real interruption is like the easy one above—I give a reason or two, you give 
one or two, and we’re back in business. Those reasons come from the only place they 
can come from—our understandings of what we’re doing. I need to say that again—
our reasons to go on in this or that way are drawn from our understanding of what 
we do. There’s no other place from which they could come. This is no guarantee of a 
happy outcome—you appeal to the authority of the map, and I appeal to the beauty 
of the view, and maybe we weight those too differently to agree. Or maybe we’re 
both rather clueless about what we’re doing, and the best reasons our 
understanding and expertise can license are just not restorative. But in any case, the 
reasons we give each other, when everything goes well, draw on what we both know 
about what we’re both doing. We understand each other because we both understand 
what we’re doing together. When you see it that way, it looks as if we already have to 
be pretty much on the same page before our reasons can be of any use. Indeed, 
reasons are effective only when the gap that we discover in our shared 
understanding is really very small. 
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Reasons-giving is so often effective in everyday contexts that it can be hard to 
get people to believe in the realistic possibility of gaps so deep that they cannot be 
overcome with reasons. Maybe it never happens. Maybe all of our interruptions and 
disagreements spring from other sources. A handy way to show that deep 
disagreements are really possible would be to find some actual ones, but we can’t do 
that. After all, how could we tell them apart from the many other kinds of stubborn 
disagreements and interruptions that plague our cooperative efforts? Certainly, we 
would expect a genuine deep disagreement to remain impervious to reasons. But 
then, others’ reasons often fail to move us, even when we see things in very much 
the same way. A lack of sufficient shared understanding might resemble, in some 
real situation, stubbornness, or ignorance, or inarticulateness, or hostility, or 
disinterest, or willfulness, or corruption, or lack of imagination, or lack of 
information, or lack of candor, or lack of thoughtfulness, or lack of sincerity, or an 
incompatible weighting of values, or any combination of these, or of many other 
hurdles. Some people, apparently, disagree with others just for the fun of it. Nothing 
about the intractability or heat of a disagreement can tell us, on their own, about the 
extent of the shared resources available to those who are disagreeing.   
That’s probably part of the reason why many insist that we should never give 
up on reasons-giving. “Don’t give in to misology,” Socrates tells us, “we are not truly 
lost until we give up on argument—keep trying.” If we take Socrates to mean that 
we should never stop producing reasons, never recognize that some gaps are too 
large to close with reasons, then, if there are deep disagreements, we have to 
recognize it as very bad advice. It’s bad in two ways. First, it will lead us, if it leads us 
anywhere, to conclusions, and then actions, that have no appropriate connection to 
our understanding. Second, it will seriously harm our reasoning skills. I’ll say a bit 
about each of these in turn. I have touched on them in the past as epistemological 
problems. Here I will try to show that they are also serious moral problems. 
On the first point:  When we continue to exchange reasons beyond where we 
should, we reason and act badly, and, in many cases, un-virtuously (which is not the 
same as viciously). To see this, it is important to see that the structure of effective 
reasoning is conservative in several ways. It is conservative insofar as it is 
restorative—it is about getting us back on the same page, or on a similar enough 
page that we can go on together, as we were (though perhaps not precisely as we 
were). It is conservative in another sense as well. I can only understand your 
reasons, they can only have a purchase on me, if they “catch” in my current 
understanding of the world. Reasons that can perform their function are those 
which call on what I know how to do. So reasons-giving is, in a sense, a return to 
who one already is, to the world one already knows. So far, then, the coarse 
structure of reasons-giving is analogous to part of a basic account of virtue. The 
virtuous person responds to the world from within her (virtuous) character. A 
situation may be novel, but how she meets it will be drawn on who she already is. 
Analogously, though we may be interrupted in a more or less novel way, the reasons 
that we give to, and accept from, one another can only usefully draw on what we 
already understand. And now maybe we can say that the relationship between 
reasons-giving and virtue is closer than mere analogy. Insofar as reasons-giving 
exploits my understanding of the world, it just is a special way, among many, of 
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accommodating my character to the world, it just is an exercise of virtue (which I’m 
not opposing here to the exercise of vice, but rather to action out of character.) None 
of this implies that we cannot innovate through reasoning. The only limits it places 
on novelty are those of unintelligibility, and there’s nothing objectionable about 
that. When we are compelled to give and consider reasons that do not, cannot, be 
grounded in our understanding, the very point of reasoning is lost, and the 
mechanism of reasoning idles. We might as well consult a Ouija board—its 
reliability will be no worse. Our decisions about how to go on will fail to work, and 
our actions will be unhinged from who we are. I hold then, that it is required of us 
morally, as well as epistemologically, to keep firmly fixed before us the idea that in 
any given situation, continued reasons-giving might hurt rather than help. There is 
no misology in that. Effective reasoning runs out, and so the production of what we 
take to be reasons ought to stop, where our understanding runs out.   
But how do we really know where our understanding runs out? That brings 
me to my second point. The second point, again, is the claim that persistence in the 
producing and exchanging of reasons, even where they cannot function effectively, 
positively harms our ability to reason well. I have lost some OSSA friends over this 
claim, and I hope I can make a better case for it this time around. For many well-
meaning people, people who are powerfully impressed by the awfulness of some 
common ways of responding to disagreements, the default setting is that reasoning 
is, at its worst, merely ineffective—it won’t hurt us, it’ll just fail. Therefore, there’s 
no reason to stop trying. But, as I say, this is not true.   
Our reasoning skills are like most of our other skills in a very important way. 
We can get better at reasoning, and we can get worse at it. With other skills or 
practices, this is obvious. Sit hunched up at your desk for a few years, and your 
ability to sit up straight will be degraded. Accidentally skip some lyrics from a song 
you can’t stop singing, and you will find it hard to get right later. Swing the golf club 
the wrong way too many times, and it becomes very difficult to swing it properly. 
The short story here is that doing something the right way requires and reinforces 
the right habits of action and judgment, and doing something the wrong way has the 
opposite effects. Reasoning really is just like that. If you do it badly, you make it 
much harder to do it well. And since reasoning is something we do together, you 
also make it harder for those around you to do it well. 
   So let’s talk about some of the skills upon which we rely when we give 
reasons. There are many of them, but if I’m right, some of the most important are 
among the most easily overlooked. I’m referring to our skills in judging just what, 
and just how much, of our understanding is shared. When I choose which of the 
millions of bits of my understanding I’m going to offer to you in support of some 
conclusion I favor (also drawn from my understanding, of course), I need to know 
just what we share, or else I won’t know just which bit you lack. If I couldn’t tell 
what we shared, I would have no idea which part of my understanding needed to be 
made explicit to get us back on the same page. It’s remarkable how good we are at 
that—on a regular basis we can diagnose the size and shape of the gap between us, 
figure out what needs to be supplied, and figure out how to supply it. And we do all 
of this against the backdrop of a shifting flow of activity, the understanding of any 
part of which can be characterized in more ways than we can count. How do we do 
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it? That’s a long and fascinating story. But right now the point is just that we have 
this skill, or skill-set, and we could not effectively give reasons without it. And again, 
what these skills really amount to is cultivating and maintaining, ready for use, a 
sense of what we really have in common with each other.   
  But now consider what happens to these skills when we advise each other to 
keep reasoning, no matter what. What we’re really doing is advising each other to 
assume and insist that we share enough to make our reasons effective. Maybe we 
could put it like this: Never accept the possibility that our understanding is 
insufficiently shared. Or maybe like this: Always proceed as if, no matter what, there 
is no understanding of life, or the world, that is significantly different from your 
own. Sounds troubling. But what I’m pursuing here is what happens to our skill at 
gauging each other’s understanding, when we are instructed to act without using it, 
to disengage it, permanently, from the rest of the activity of reasoning. Like any skill 
of judgment, it erodes when it is not used. Just as a constantly blindfolded archer’s 
aim would deteriorate, we lose our sense of what we share with the many others in 
our lives when we are told never to worry about it.   
Of course life calls on our understanding of each other, our sense of what we 
share with those around us, generally and specifically, at many times. But 
appropriate reasoning places a special demand on that sense, keeps it sharp, trims 
its errors, and highlights its deficiencies. When we are told to do our reasoning 
without it, we do indeed start to lose track of each other, and therefore even of 
ourselves. And without a doubt, the reasoning we do without it will be random and 
capricious—hardly useful at all.    
You might think that things can’t be that bad. Surely, there is something self-
correcting about reasoning undertaken without any regard to the presence of its 
necessary conditions. Surely, when we all get rusty enough at reasoning, it will 
show. Then we can all go to OSSA and get straightened out by the experts. Alas, that 
is not true. Skills deteriorate incrementally, and when we’re talking about the skills 
that help to define and maintain a culture, their deterioration is very difficult to 
notice. Further, bad habits and deteriorating skills find support in other bad habits. 
Slouch in your chair for long enough, and you’ll soon find yourself used to propping 
up your head with your hands.   
We certainly do something like chin-propping to support our bad reasoning 
habits. Remember, any activity can be described in any number of ways. That means 
that any conflicting understanding of what we’re doing together, any impasse we 
reach when trying to go on together, can be met with a description that presents no 
conflicts. What we ought to do when we find that we may deeply disagree, is to stop 
reasoning, and then, if going on together is important, see if we can make 
substantive changes in what one or all of us understand. That’s a slow and painful 
process. It is also a process that can be subject to abuse, certainly. But so can the 
way we usually proceed. Here’s what we usually do:  We reach an impasse, have no 
sense of why we can’t produce reasons that convince each other, believe that we 
should keep trying, and then pretend to be discovering greater common ground by 
merely re-describing, in a more general way, what we were doing. We haven’t really 
changed what we understand, or how much understanding we share. So the 
resources upon which we could draw to give each other effective reasons haven’t 
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changed at all. All that’s changed is how much we appear to have in common, and 
that, on its own, unfortunately, seems to authorize us to keep trying. I believe that 
this happens all the time, captured in phrases we all recognize:  “This isn’t about 
labor vs. management—it’s about coming together to do what’s best for the whole 
organization.” Or, “I’m not trying to make your life more difficult, I’m just trying to 
look out for the standards we all cherish in this community.” Are phrases like this 
always the chin-propping concomitants of unhinged and rudderless pseudo-
reasoning? Not always. But often. And often it isn’t hard to hear in them something 
darker, something more like manipulation than like genuine attempts to repair gaps 
in our intersubjectivity. 
What I’m suggesting is that a consequence of our prejudice to the effect that 
we should never give up on reasons-giving is a loss of the very skills by which we 
judge what we share, and how to select and offer parts of what we don’t share, in a 
way that makes them intelligible and effective as reasons. And that loss is masked by 
an abuse of our ability to re-describe what we’re doing, creating the impression that 
we are not suffering from differences which should compel us to stop trying. We are 
thus further separated from what we know and from each other, and that is a sad 
and ironic destination to reach by travelling on a path that puts reasoning first. 
If I’m correct about how reasoning works when we use it to get on with 
things we’re doing, then the prejudice against the possibility of deep disagreement 
is a real moral problem. Maybe there are no deep disagreements, in the technical 
sense I’ve been outlining. But that’s not the point. The point is that we will reach bad 
conclusions about how to go on, and we will harm our reasoning skills, and we will 
alienate ourselves from others, and even from ourselves, unless we are willing to 
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